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Abstract
In a simple dynamic macroeconomic model,  it is shown
that uncertainty about structural parameters does not
necessarily lead to more cautious monetary policy,
refining the accepted wisdom concerning the effects
of parameter uncertainty on optimal policy. In
particular, when there is uncertainty about the
persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the
central bank to respond more aggressively to shocks
than under certainty equivalence, since the central
bank this way reduces uncertainty about the future
development of inflation. Uncertainty about other
parameters, in contrast, acts to dampen the policy
response.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy, parameter
uncertainty, Brainard conservatism, interest rate
smoothing.
JEL Classification: E43, E52.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that policymakers facing uncertainty about the eﬀects of policy
on the economy should be more cautious when implementing policy than if acting
under complete certainty (or certainty equivalence). The attractiveness of this result,
named the ‘Brainard conservatism principle’ by Alan Blinder (1997, 1998) after the
original analysis of William Brainard (1967), lies in both the simplicity of the original
argument and in the underlying intuition. That the argument is well understood
and used by central bankers in the practical policy process is made clear by, for
example, Blinder (1998) and Goodhart (1999).
However, Brainard’s analysis concerned only uncertainty about the transmis-
sion of policy to a target variable. It is less clear whether his result also applies
to uncertainty concerning other parameters in the economy. The purpose of this
paper, therefore, is to analyze the eﬀects of multiplicative parameter uncertainty in
a dynamic macroeconomic model typically used for monetary policy analysis, de-
veloped by Svensson (1997, 1999). Recently, Svensson (1999) has shown that the
Brainard conservatism result holds in a special case of that model: when there is
uncertainty about some of the structural parameters, the optimal policy response
to current inﬂation and output (i.e., the coeﬃcients in the policymaker’s optimal
reaction function) are shown to get smaller as the amount of uncertainty increases.1
Due to the complexity of the model with parameter uncertainty, however, Svensson
chooses to analyze a special case, where only inﬂation (and no measure of output)
enters the central bank’s objective function. In the present paper, Svensson’s anal-
ysis will be extended to cover uncertainty about all structural parameters of the
model, and the preferences of the central bank in the choice between stabilizing out-
put and inﬂation are allowed to vary. In addition to the initial response of policy,
the time path of policy after a shock is also examined.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results show that parameter uncertainty does not
necessarily dampen the policy response, but may actually make policy more aggres-
sive than under certainty equivalence. In particular, when the central bank puts
some weight on stabilizing output in addition to inﬂation, uncertainty about the
persistence of inﬂation increases the optimal reaction function coeﬃcients. Uncer-
tainty about other parameters, in contrast, always dampens the policy response.
The reason is that when the dynamics of inﬂation are uncertain, the amount of
1Similar results have been reached by, e.g., Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Sack (1998a), and
Wieland (1998).
1uncertainty facing policymakers is greater the further away the inﬂation rate is from
target. Consequently, to reduce the amount of uncertainty about the future path
of inﬂation, optimal policy is more aggressive, pushing inﬂation closer to target.2
In contrast, the persistence of output is a crucial part of the transmission of policy
to inﬂation, so uncertainty concerning the dynamics of output makes policy less
aggressive.
Perhaps less surprisingly, when parameter uncertainty does act to dampen the
current policy response, it is optimal for the central bank to return to a neutral
policy stance later than under certainty equivalence. This is due to the persistence
of inﬂation and output: a smaller initial response leads to larger deviations of the
goal variables from target in future periods, so policy needs to be away from neutral
for a longer time to get the economy back on track. Thus, parameter uncertainty
can lead to a smoother policy path in response to shocks, an issue analyzed in more
detail by Sack (1998a) and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the theoretical framework is pre-
sented, and the optimal policy of the central bank is derived in a dynamic economy
with stochastic parameters. Since analytical solutions of the model are diﬃcult,
if not impossible, to ﬁnd, Section 3 presents numerical solutions for diﬀerent con-
ﬁgurations of uncertainty, to establish the eﬀects of parameter uncertainty on the




The basic model used in the analysis is the dynamic aggregate supply-aggregate
demand framework developed by Lars Svensson (1997, 1999), which is similar to
many other models used for monetary policy analysis, for example by Ball (1997),
Cecchetti (1998), Taylor (1994), and Wieland (1998). The model consists of two
equations relating the output gap (the percentage deviation of output from its ‘nat-
ural’ level) and the inﬂation rate to each other and to a monetary policy instrument,
2These results are closely related to those of Craine (1979), who shows that uncertainty about
the impact eﬀect of policy leads to less aggressive policy behavior, but uncertainty about the
dynamics of the economy leads to more aggressive policy, albeit in a univariate model. Also,
Sargent (1999) and Onatski and Stock (1998), using robust control theory, argue that a central
bank trying to avoid bad outcomes in the future may respond more aggressively to shocks when
uncertainty increases.
2the short-term interest rate. Assuming a quadratic objective function for the central
bank, one can solve for the optimal decision rule as a function of current output and
inﬂation, similar to a Taylor (1993) rule.
Important features of the model are the inclusion of control lags in the monetary
transmission mechanism, and the fact that monetary policy only aﬀects the rate of
inﬂation indirectly, via the output gap. Monetary policy is assumed to aﬀect the
output gap with a lag of one period, which in turn aﬀects inﬂation in the subsequent
period.3 Policymakers thus control the inﬂation rate with a lag of two periods. In the
simplest version, including only one lag,4 the output gap (the percentage deviation
of output from its ‘potential’ level) in period t +1 ,yt+1, is related to the past
output gap and the ex-post real interest rate in the previous period, it − πt,b yt h e
relationship





t+1 is an i.i.d. demand shock with mean zero and constant variance σ2
y.T h e
rate of inﬂation between periods t and t+1,πt+1, (or rather, its deviation from the
long-run average inﬂation rate, given by the constant inﬂation target) depends on
past inﬂation and the output gap in the previous period according to the Phillips
curve relation




t+1 is an i.i.d. supply shock with zero mean and variance σ2
π.N o t et h a ta l l
variables are measured as deviations from their respective long-run averages. Thus,
negative values of the interest rate are allowed.
In the model presented here, there are two important modiﬁcations to the original
Svensson framework: the persistence parameter of the inﬂation process, δt+1,i s
allowed to take values diﬀerent from unity; and the parameters of the model are
stochastic, and therefore time-varying. When the central bank sets its interest rate
instrument at time t, it is assumed to know all realizations of the parameters up
to and including period t, but it does not know their future realizations, and thus
3In the simple one-lag model used here, one period can be thought of as equal to one year.
The short interest rate could then be interpreted as the central bank’s interest rate instrument,
assumed to be held constant for a year at a time. See Svensson (1999).
4Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999) use a version of the model including
four lags in each relationship, and estimate it on quarterly U.S. data. S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999) also
formally tests the restrictions imposed by Svensson (1997, 1999).
3cannot be certain about the eﬀects of policy on the economy.5 The parameters are
assumed to be random variables with means E(αt+1)=α, E(βt+1)=β, E(γt+1)=γ,




δ. They are also assumed to be




the realizations of the parameters are drawn from the same distribution in each
period, so issues of learning and experimentation are disregarded in the analysis.7
For simplicity, the model (1)–(2) does not include any forward-looking elements,
a feature which could be seen as unrealistic. Nevertheless, as shown by Estrella
and Fuhrer (1998, 1999), purely forward-looking models of monetary policy are less
successful in matching the data than backward-looking speciﬁcations, and they are
not necessarily less sensitive to the Lucas critique. Also, hybrid models, including
both forward- and backward-looking features, in many ways behave similarly to the
purely backward-looking model used here.
2.2 Optimal policy
To determine the optimal path for the interest rate, the central bank is assumed to
minimize the expected discounted sum of future values of a loss function, which is
quadratic in output and inﬂation deviations from target (here normalized to zero).8









5That policymakers do not have complete information about the parameters in an economy is
clearly not an unrealistic assumption. Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989) point to three reasons why
a model’s parameters may be seen as stochastic: (1) they are genuinely random; (2) they are really
ﬁxed, but are impossible to estimate precisely, due to the sampling variability in a ﬁnite data set;
and (3) they vary according to some well-deﬁned but imperfectly known scheme, e.g., because the
model is a linearization around a trajectory of uncertain exogenous variables. Blinder (1997, 1998),
Goodhart (1999), and Poole (1998) all stress the relevance of uncertainty for practical monetary
policy.
6The assumption of independence is convenient for the derivation of optimal policy, and may
be realistic if the model equations (1) and (2) are interpreted as structural relationships. If, on
the other hand, one interprets the model as reduced-form relations derived from microeconomic
foundations, the parameters might well be correlated if they are derived from the same micro
relations.
7See Sack (1998b) or Wieland (1998) for similar models of monetary policy including learning
and experimentation; or Balvers and Cosimano (1994), Ba¸ sar and Salmon (1990), and Bertocchi
and Spagat (1993) for models in slightly diﬀerent contexts.
8The central bank is thus allowed to have explicit targets for both inﬂation and output. The
output target is given by the potential level, so the central bank aims at a zero output gap
(excluding the possibility of a systematic inﬂation bias). The inﬂation target pins down the long-
run average inﬂation rate, so the target for π, the deviation of inﬂation from the average, is also
zero.






and where φ is the central bank’s (constant) discount factor.9 The parameter λ ≥ 0
speciﬁes the relative weight of output to inﬂation stabilization, and is assumed to
be known and constant.10 In the simple case when parameters are non-stochastic,
it is relatively straightforward to ﬁnd an analytical solution for the optimization
problem (3), as shown by Svensson (1997, 1999). When parameters are stochastic,
however, ﬁnding an analytical solution is prohibitively diﬃcult, so I shall here focus
on numerical solutions.11
The inclusion of parameter uncertainty into this model will have an important
eﬀect on optimal policy. As is well known, optimal policy in a linear-quadratic
framework with only additive uncertainty exhibits certainty equivalence. Conse-
quently, the degree of uncertainty does not aﬀect the optimal policy rule, which
depends only on the expected value of the goal variables, so the central bank acts
as in a non-stochastic economy. As will be clear below, when incorporating multi-
plicative parameter uncertainty into the model, certainty equivalence ceases to hold,
and the variances of the state variables will aﬀect the optimal policy rule. Thus, the
amount of uncertainty facing policymakers has a decisive inﬂuence on their optimal
behavior.
To solve the central bank’s optimization problem it is convenient to rewrite the
model (1)–(2) in state-space form as
xt+1 = At+1xt + Bt+1it + εt+1, (5)
9The quadratic speciﬁcation of the objective function is very common in the literature. Some
authors, e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (1999), include an interest rate
smoothing objective in the loss function to capture the apparent preference of central banks for
small persistent changes in the instrument. As shown by Sack (1998a) and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999),
however, such an ad hoc smoothing objective is not necessary to mimic policy behavior in the
U.S., at least not in an unrestricted VAR framework.
10Typically, λ is positive also in regimes of inﬂation targeting, since central banks seemingly want
to stabilize also short-term ﬂuctuations in output. See Svensson (1998) for a discussion of ‘strict’
versus ‘ﬂexible’ inﬂation targeting, and Fischer (1996) for a critique of central banks’ tendency to
only acknowledge price stability and not output stabilization as the goal of monetary policy.
11Svensson (1999) analytically solves a very simple case of parameter uncertainty, where δt+1
is non-stochastic and always equal to unity, and where λ = 0. Since the most interesting results
are obtained when λ>0a n dδt+1 is stochastic, I shall not follow his route. In independent
research, Srour (1999) analyzes a similar model under parameter uncertainty, and solves the model
analytically for the case of a ﬁnite time horizon. His results partly overlap with those presented
here.
5where xt+1 =[yt+1 πt+1 ]  is a state vector, and εt+1 =[ε
y
t+1 επ
t+1 ]  is a vector




































































Using the state-space formulation, the central bank’s optimization problem can





tQxt + φEtJ(xt+1)], (8)
subject to (5), where Q is a (2 × 2) preference matrix of the central bank, with λ




t+1Vx t+1 + w, (9)
where the matrix V remains to be determined.
To illustrate the eﬀects of including multiplicative uncertainty into the model,
and show why certainty equivalence no longer holds, it is instructive to consider the
expected value of the value function (9). In the general case, this expected value is
EtJ(xt+1)=( Etxt+1)
 V (Etxt+1) + tr(V Σt+1|t)+w, (10)
where Σt+1|t is the variance-covariance matrix of xt+1, evaluated at time t,a n dt h e
notation ‘tr’ denotes the trace operator. The variance-covariance matrix is given by
Σt+1|t = Et [xt+1 − Etxt+1][xt+1 − Etxt+1]
  , (11)
where
xt+1 − Etxt+1 =( At+1 − A)xt +( Bt+1 − B)it + εt+1. (12)
When the parameters are non-stochastic, so At+1 = A and Bt+1 = B for all t,
xt+1 − Etxt+1 = εt+1, so the variance-covariance matrix Σt+1|t coincides with the
6variance matrix of the disturbance vector εt+1, and thus is independent of the instru-
ment it. Therefore, although the expected value of the objective function depends
on the variance of the disturbances, the optimal policy rule is independent of the
degree of uncertainty, so optimal policy is certainty equivalent. In contrast, when
the parameters are uncertain, the variance-covariance matrix depends on the state
of the economy (xt), the instrument (it), and the variances of the parameters as
well as those of the additive disturbances. Optimal policy will then minimize not
only the future deviation of the expected state variables from target (via the term
(Etxt+1) V (Etxt+1)), but also their variance. Thus, certainty equivalence ceases to
hold, and optimal policy depends crucially on the degree of uncertainty in the econ-
omy.12
Appendix A shows that the optimal decision rule for the central bank is to set
the short-term interest rate as a linear function of the state vector in each period,
that is,
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AB denotes the covariance matrix of the ith row of At+1 with the jth row of
Bt+1,a n dvij denotes element (i,j) of the matrix V , which is given by iterating on
the Ricatti equation
V = Q + φ(A + Bf)















To obtain an analytical solution for this problem, one would need to solve equa-
tions (14)–(15) for the ﬁxed-point value of V . For some simple conﬁgurations, for
example, in the non-stochastic case, this is manageable (although tedious), since
the system of equations obtained is relatively straightforward to solve. In this setup
of multiplicative parameter uncertainty, however, the system of equations is highly
non-linear and far too complicated to yield a usable solution. Therefore I proceed
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7by numerical methods to analyze the optimal behavior of the central bank in this
setting.
3 The eﬀects of parameter uncertainty on optimal policy
Having derived the optimal policy rule (13) for the central bank, this section will
analyze how the rule, and the resulting path of the short-term interest rate, depends
on the degree of uncertainty in the economy. I therefore choose some values for the
parameter means α,β,γ,a n dδ, and for the discount factor φ, and then examine





δ, varying the preference parameter λ.
Shocks to output and inﬂation in equations (1) and (2) will aﬀect monetary
policy on two diﬀerent, but related, levels. First, there is an initial eﬀect, as policy
is adjusted to respond to current shocks. This eﬀect is given by the vector f in the
decision rule (13). Second, there is a dynamic eﬀect of shocks, since these will not be
completely oﬀset in the initial period, but will partly be transmitted to subsequent
periods through the dynamics of the economy. Thus policy will also need to respond
to past shocks, as these remain in the economy. I will distinguish between these two
eﬀects, and begin by analyzing the initial response of policy in Section 3.1, followed
by an analysis of the dynamic response over time in Section 3.2.
The exact parameter values used for this numerical exercise are chosen so as to
best illustrate the results, but are also consistent with empirical studies of the mon-
etary transmission mechanism both in the Euro area and the U.S.13 The reported
results do not depend on the exact conﬁguration of parameter values, but hold for
many diﬀerent plausible and implausible conﬁgurations.
The mean of the persistence parameter of the output gap, αt+1,i sg i v e nav a l u e
of 0.85, taken from Cooley and Hansen (1995, Table 7.1). This value is the auto-
correlation coeﬃcient of the observed detrended output process, and as such would
tend to overestimate the true persistence of the output gap, unaﬀected by active
stabilization policy. To the parameter βt+1, the elasticity of output with respect to
the real interest rate, a mean value of 0.35 is assigned, taken from Fuhrer’s esti-
mate of output’s sensitivity to the long real interest rate for the U.S. from 1966 to
1993 (Fuhrer, 1994, Table 3). The mean of the persistence parameter of the Phillips
13Orphanides and Wieland (1999) estimate a similar model on both Euro area and U.S. data,
restricting the parameter δ to unity. Their parameter estimates (using OECD data) are α =0 .77
(0.11), β =0 .40 (0.10), γ =0 .34 (0.13) for the Euro area, and α =0 .47 (0.16), β =0 .32 (0.13),
γ =0 .39 (0.09) for the U.S. (with standard errors in parentheses).
8Table 1: Numerical values of parameter means and variances
Stochastic parameters Non-stochastic parameters
Mean Variance Value
αt+1 0.85 {0.10, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.01} φ 0.95
βt+1 0.35 {0.00, 0.10, 0.00, 0.00, 0.01, 0.01} λ [0,2]
γt+1 0.4 {0.00, 0.00, 0.10, 0.00, 0.01, 0.01}
δt+1 1.0 {0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.10, 0.10, 0.20}
curve, δt+1, is assigned a value of unity, leading to a standard accelerationist Phillips
curve, on average. Finally, for γt+1, the inﬂation rate’s sensitivity to the output gap,
I assign a mean value of 0.4, which is approximately what Romer (1996, Table 2)
ﬁnds for the U.S. economy for the period 1952–73, and which is also consistent with
the correlation coeﬃcient reported by Cooley and Hansen (1995, Table 7.1).
To analyze the eﬀects of parameter uncertainty on policy, I begin by considering
uncertainty about each of the four parameters separately. Thus, the variance of
the uncertain parameter is set to 0.1, and the other variances to zero. At a second
stage, I consider combinations of uncertainty about the parameters, always with the
variances of αt+1,β t+1,a n dγt+1 set to 0.01, but ﬁrst when the degree of uncertainty
about the persistence parameter of inﬂation δt+1 is relatively small (so its variance
is 0.1), and secondly when it is relatively large (and its variance is 0.2). In each
case, optimal policy will be compared to the certainty equivalence case, when all
parameters are constant and equal to their means. The actual degree of uncertainty
assigned through the parameter variances is chosen to make clear the eﬀects of
parameter uncertainty on policy. The qualitative results remain irrespective of the
actual size of the parameter variances.
The resulting values for the means and variances of the stochastic parameters
are given in the left-hand panel of Table 1. As shown in the right-hand panel, the
discount factor φ is assigned a value of 0.95, implying a discount rate of 5% per
period. Finally, since the eﬀects of uncertainty on policy depend crucially on the
value of the preference parameter λ, this will be allowed to take values varying from
0, that is, ‘strict inﬂation targeting’, to 2, with a larger weight on stabilizing output
than on ﬁghting inﬂation.
3.1 The initial policy response
As a ﬁrst step, let us analyze the initial policy response to current inﬂation and out-
put (i.e., the coeﬃcients of the f-vector in equation (13)) when there is uncertainty
about each of the four parameters separately. These responses are shown in Figures 1
9Figure 1: Initial response to output and inﬂation, impact uncertainty
and 2, letting λ vary between 0and 2. In each ﬁgure, the left-hand graph shows
the response to output (or demand shocks) and the right-hand graph the response
to inﬂation (supply shocks), with the solid line representing the certainty equivalent
case, and the dashed line representing the response under parameter uncertainty.14
First, Figure 1 shows the two cases of ‘impact uncertainty’, i.e., when there is
uncertainty about the parameters in the transmission mechanism, βt+1 and γt+1.A s
is clear, the Brainard conservatism result is conﬁrmed: when there is uncertainty
concerning the impact parameters, the optimal response coeﬃcients are smaller than
under certainty equivalence, so optimal policy is less aggressive. Increasing the
variance of either parameter will weaken the response of the central bank, and in
the limit, as the variances tend to inﬁnity, the optimal response is to do nothing.
This is true for all values of λ, although the eﬀect of uncertainty is larger for small
λ. Furthermore, the eﬀect of uncertainty about βt+1, the elasticity of the output gap
with respect to the real interest rate, has a larger eﬀect on policy than uncertainty
concerning γt+1, the parameter of transmission from output to inﬂation.
Second, consider Figure 2, which shows the response coeﬃcients under uncer-
tainty about the two persistence parameters, αt+1 and δt+1. As seen in the two
top graphs, uncertainty about the persistence of output aﬀects policy in the same
14Note that the response coeﬃcients to both output and inﬂation are decreasing in λ.T h i s i s
because policy oﬀsets shocks to both output and inﬂation by creating a recession. As the weight
on output stabilization increases, optimal policy creates a smaller recession in response to a given
shock.
10Figure 2: Initial response to output and inﬂation, dynamic uncertainty
manner as uncertainty about the transmission parameters (albeit to a smaller de-
gree): the initial response gets less aggressive than under certainty equivalence. In
contrast, uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation in the two bottom graphs
aﬀects the optimal policy coeﬃcients in the opposite direction. For λ>0, optimal
policy is more aggressive under uncertainty than under certainty equivalence, in
contradiction to the Brainard intuition. When λ = 0, however, uncertainty about
δt+1 has no eﬀect on optimal policy.15
Since these results may be counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance, they may need some
further consideration. The model used here diﬀers from that of Brainard (1967)
in two respects: it is dynamic rather than static, and it incorporates uncertainty
concerning not only the impact eﬀect of policy, but also concerning the dynamic de-
velopment of the economy. As mentioned above, the central bank wants to minimize
the future deviation of expected inﬂation and output from target as well as their
variance. When parameters are non-stochastic, so there is only additive uncertainty
in the model, the variance of inﬂation and output is constant, and thus independent
of their distance from target. Under multiplicative parameter uncertainty, however,
when the dynamics of the variables are uncertain, their variances increase with the
distance from target, so when inﬂation and output are further away from target,
the uncertainty about their future development is greater. Since the persistence
15Since writing the ﬁrst version of this paper, I have discovered independent work by Srour
(1999) and Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) who both demonstrate versions of this results.
11of inﬂation only aﬀects the dynamics of the economy, optimal policy reduces the
amount of uncertainty about future inﬂation by acting more aggressively to push
inﬂation closer to target.16 On the other hand, although a similar eﬀect is present
for uncertainty about the dynamics of output, the persistence of the output pro-
cess is also a crucial part of the transmission mechanism from policy to inﬂation.
Therefore, uncertainty about the persistence of output has the traditional eﬀect of
making policy less aggressive.
It is also noteworthy that the eﬀect on policy of uncertainty concerning the
dynamics of inﬂation only operates when the central bank gives some weight to
output in its loss function, so λ>0. When the central bank cares only about
stabilizing inﬂation (when λ = 0), it is always optimal to push inﬂation to target as
quickly as possible (i.e., after two periods). Then uncertainty about the dynamics
of inﬂation has no eﬀect on optimal policy. When λ>0, on the other hand, optimal
policy closes only a fraction of the gap between expected inﬂation and target in each
period, and with a larger λ, the size of this fraction is smaller, so inﬂation is returned
to target more slowly (see Svensson, 1997). As a consequence, uncertainty about
the dynamics of inﬂation aﬀects policy more strongly when λ increases, a pattern
that is clear from the bottom graphs of Figure 2.17
Finally, consider the case when there is uncertainty about all four parameters,
shown in Figure 3. Now we have two diﬀerent possibilities: when λ is low, optimal
policy under uncertainty is more cautious than under certainty, since the uncertainty
about αt+1,β t+1,a n dγt+1 dampens the response, but the uncertainty about δt+1
has no or little eﬀect. As λ increases, the uncertainty about δt+1 starts to aﬀect
the response positively, and eventually the response under uncertainty might get
stronger than under certainty. For a given λ, whether the initial response is more or
less aggressive under uncertainty depends on the relative variances of αt+1,β t+1,a n d
γt+1 on the one hand and δt+1 on the other. When the degree of uncertainty about
δt+1 is relatively small (σ2
δ =0 .1) in the top graphs of Figure 3, the response to supply
shocks is larger under uncertainty for λ ≥ 0.58, whereas the response to demand
shocks is always smaller under uncertainty.18 When uncertainty about δt+1 gets
relatively more important, however, in the lower part of Figure 3 (where σ2
δ =0 .2),
16It should be noted that the qualitative eﬀects of uncertainty concerning δt+1 do not hinge on
its mean value being equal to unity. For smaller values of the mean, uncertainty still makes policy
more aggressive, although quantitatively the eﬀects get smaller.
17In practice, the case where λ = 0 is probably less realistic than that with a positive λ,s i n c e
central banks typically want to avoid excessive real ﬂuctutations. See, e.g., Svensson (1998).
18For these parameter values, this is true for all λ at least up to 50,000.
12Figure 3: Initial response to output and inﬂation, all parameters uncertain
policy is more likely to be more aggressive under uncertainty; the corresponding
cutoﬀ values are now λ ≥ 0.66 for demand shocks and λ ≥ 0.22 for supply shocks .
As a consequence, the net eﬀect on policy of parameter uncertainty depends not only
on the relative variances of the shocks, but also on the weight of output stabilization
in the central bank’s loss function.
In related work, Craine (1979) comes to a similar conclusion, using a dynamic
model with one target variable: uncertainty about the impact of policy on the
economy leads to less aggressive policy in response to shocks, but uncertainty about
the dynamics of the economy leads to more aggressive policy.19 In that simple
setup, it is straightforward to separate uncertainty about the transmission of policy
from uncertainty about the dynamics of the economy. In the Svensson model, this
separation is less clear-cut. Thus, the analysis above shows that the Craine (1979)
result is valid also in the Svensson setup, but with one qualiﬁcation: since policy
aﬀects inﬂation via output, the dynamics of the output process is an important part
of the transmission of policy to inﬂation. Uncertainty about the dynamics of output
therefore makes policy less aggressive.
Also, Onatski and Stock (1998) and Sargent (1999) make a similar point, using
robust control theory: when the policymaker chooses policy to minimize the risk
of bad outcomes under model uncertainty, particular conﬁgurations of uncertainty
lead to more aggressive policy than under certainty equivalence. Intuitively, ‘cau-
19See also Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989).
13Figure 4: Policy response over time, all parameters uncertain
tious’ policy can also mean that bad future outcomes are avoided by acting more
aggressively today.
3.2 The time path of policy
The introduction of multiplicative parameter uncertainty also has interesting impli-
cations for the dynamic response of monetary policy, that is, the response of policy
to past shocks to output and inﬂation. Figures 4–6 show the response of monetary
policy to supply and demand shocks over the ﬁrst ten periods following a shock, for




γ =0 .01, and σ2
δ =0 .2, so uncertainty about δt+1
strongly dominates. Figure 5 illustrates the case where there is uncertainty only





δ = 0. Figure 6 shows the case where there is uncertainty only about the persis-
tence parameter in the inﬂation equation, δt+1,w i t hσ2




As noted by Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999), in the simple Svensson model
under certainty equivalence, the response of monetary policy over time varies sub-
stantially with the preference parameter λ. In particular, for small values of λ,t h e
optimal policy response to an inﬂationary shock under certain parameter conﬁgu-
rations is to raise the interest rate instrument in the ﬁrst period, but then lower it
below the initial level and move back to a neutral policy (with i =0)f r o mb e l o w .
This is shown by the solid lines in the top two graphs of Figures 4–6.
14Figure 5: Policy response over time, impact uncertainty only
Figure 6: Policy response over time, adjustment uncertainty only
15When parameters are uncertain, this behavior can be mitigated or magniﬁed,
depending on whether the initial response is dampened or strengthened. When, as
in the bottom graphs of Figure 4, uncertainty about δt+1 dominates (since λ =1 ) ,s o
that the initial policy response is more aggressive under uncertainty, policy in later
periods is closer to neutral, since the strong initial move has neutralized a larger
part of the shock. If, on the other hand, uncertainty about αt+1,β t+1,a n dγt+1
dominates, as in Figure 5, so that the policy response is initially dampened, policy
stays away from neutral longer, to compensate for the weaker initial response.
Thus, as is clear from Figure 5, parameter uncertainty can lead to smoother
paths of the interest rate than under certainty equivalence, without introducing an
explicit smoothing objective into the central bank’s loss function. Casual observation
suggests that central banks tend to respond to shocks by ﬁrst slowly moving the
interest rate in one direction, and then gradually moving back to a more neutral
stance. When parameters are certain, the model suggests a large initial move, and
then a quick return to the original level, unless λ is very large. Under certain
conﬁgurations of parameter uncertainty, however, the central bank behaves in a
more gradual way: although the initial response is always the strongest, it is more
modest under these cases of uncertainty, and the policy move is drawn out longer
over time. In particular, the tendency of the bank to ‘whipsaw’ the market by
creating large swings in the interest rate is mitigated.20
Finally, for completeness, Figure 6 shows the optimal time path of policy when
only the persistence of inﬂation is uncertain. When λ = 0in the top panels, the paths
under parameter uncertainty and certainty equivalence coincide, since uncertainty
about the persistence of inﬂation has no eﬀect on optimal policy. When λ =1 ,
policy is initially more aggressive under parameter uncertainty, which allows the
central bank to return to a neutral stance earlier.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper demonstrates how uncertainty about parameters in a dynamic macroeco-
nomic model can lead the central bank to pursue more aggressive monetary policy,
providing a counterexample to the common wisdom following the results of Brainard
(1967). When a policymaker is uncertain about the dynamics of the economy, he
20This issue of parameter uncertainty leading to more plausible paths of policy is examined more
carefully by Sack (1998a) and S¨ oderstr¨ om (1999). The latter shows, however, that the Svensson
model always implies excessive volatility of the policy instrument, whereas optimal policy from an
unrestricted VAR model comes very close to mimicking the actual behavior of the Federal Reserve.
16might ﬁnd it optimal to move more aggressively in response to shocks, so as to reduce
uncertainty about the future path of the economy. Uncertainty about the impact
eﬀect of policy still leads to less aggressive policy, in accordance with Brainard’s
original analysis.
It should be stressed that the model and the examples used are highly stylized
and may not be entirely satisfactory from an empirical point of view, so any seri-
ous implications for policy are diﬃcult to estimate. However, the qualitative points
obtained from this simple model are also present in a more general empirical frame-
work, similar to that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and are likely to remain
also in models incorporating partially forward-looking behavior.
It is possible that conﬁgurations of uncertainty in the real world are such that the
Brainard result is always valid, or to quote Blinder (1998, p. 12), “My intuition tells
me that this ﬁnding is more general—or at least more wise—in the real world than
the mathematics will support.” Using the standard errors of econometric param-
eter estimates as proxies for the degree of uncertainty concerning each parameter
in a more complete econometric formulation of the Svensson model, S¨ oderstr¨ om
(1999) shows that in the resulting conﬁguration of variances, transmission uncer-
tainty dominates uncertainty about the dynamics, so parameter uncertainty does
act to dampen policy. Also, Rudebusch (1999) argues that multiplicative parame-
ter uncertainty has made Federal Reserve policy less aggressive, although it is not
suﬃcient as an explanation for the Fed’s cautious behavior. Nevertheless, the main
point in this paper is that the eﬀects on policy of parameter uncertainty may be
less clear-cut than previously recognized. Determining the relevance of this result
for actual policy should be an interesting topic for future research.
17A Solving the control problem
First, the state vector xt+1 has expected value















evaluated at t. Since all parameters are assumed independent, the oﬀ-diagonal
elements of Σt+1|t are zero. The diagonal elements are
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where v11 and v22 are the diagonal elements of the matrix V .
18Using equations (9), (10), and (16) in the control problem (8), we can express
the Bellman equation as
x
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so the matrix V is determined by
V = Q + φ(A + Bf)















See also Chow (1975).
21Use the rules ∂x Ax/∂x =( A + A )x, ∂y Bz/∂y = Bz,a n d∂y Bz/∂z = B y, see, e.g.,
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997). Note also that V is not necessarily symmetric in this setup with
multiplicative uncertainty.
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